Criminal Law - Chronic Alcoholics Can Not Be Convicted for Public Drunkenness. Driver v. Hinnant, __ F.2d __ (1966) by McDonald, Charles
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 18
Criminal Law - Chronic Alcoholics Can Not Be
Convicted for Public Drunkenness. Driver v.
Hinnant, __ F.2d __ (1966)
Charles McDonald
Copyright c 1966 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Charles McDonald, Criminal Law - Chronic Alcoholics Can Not Be Convicted for Public Drunkenness.
Driver v. Hinnant, __ F.2d __ (1966), 7 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 394 (1966),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss2/18
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:391
rule peculiar to the first category of abandoned property,0 and em-
ployed it without distinction to a case which properly falls within the
second.'
However, by upholding the admissibility of the evidence on the sole
ground that the car was abandoned by Hawley, without a finding that
consent had been secured from the subsequent lawful possessor; the
Virginia court has found as reasonable a search without a warrant that
does not lie within the construction which the courts have established
defining the limits to which a search and seizure should be permitted.'
Consequently, abandoned property in Virginia on the basis of this de-
cision is no longer, under any circumstances, related to reasonable
search and seizure, but lies rather within that area to which the Fourth
Amendment has no application.
Robert E. Scott
Criminal Law-CHmoNic ALCOHOLICs CAN NOT BE CONVICTED FOR
PUBLIC DRUNKEN NESS. In the case of Driver v. Hinant,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overruled earlier hold-
ings of the North Carolina State Supreme Court' and a United States
16. Supra, note 7. In this case where property had been abandoned by the owners
in open fields (to which the fourth Amendment guarantees do not extend), the court
held that, "there is no seizure in the sense of law" where the officers examined the
contents of the property after it had been abandoned.
17. For a discussion of the rule that automobiles are protected from unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment see Weller v. Russell, supra, note 9.
18. From this finding follows the presumption that the search cannot be justified
as being reasonable on the basis of any previous federal precedents. If consent is not
required by the Virginia courts in order to make the search reasonable, on what basis
can it be held to be such. Abandonment as a general abstract does not justify a search.
For after property has been abandoned either: (1) it is found in some area outside the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, or (2) it is found in an area secured from un-
reasonable search by constitutional guarantees. Therefore, some other factors must be
present. Logically, if a right to possession is abandoned some others' rights must accede.
Under the second possibility above these new possessory rights would be protected
from unreasonable search. If so, how can a search be reasonable which is conducted,
in the absence of probable cause, without the consent of the acceding possessor?
1. - F.2d (1966).
2. State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
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District Court3 and decided that a chronic alcoholic can not be crim-
inally convicted and sentenced for public drunkenness.
Driver, an uncontested alcoholic,4 had been convicted in accordance
with a North Carolina statute5 on his fifth charge of public drunkenness
in twelve months and sentenced to two concurrent two year terms.
The District Court upheld this conviction and concluded that Driver's
sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.6
In reaching this decision the District Court noted that alcoholism is a
disease7 but stated that the North Carolina Statute only punished public
drunkenness as an anti-social-criminal-act and did not punish either
the disease or the symptoms of the disease. Relying on past North
Carolina cases, the court ruled that the Statute was not unconstitutional;8
nor was the punishment prescribed and consequently inflicted cruel and
S. Driver v. Hinant, 243 F.Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C., 1965).
4. Ibid, at p. 97- The testimony of Driver's physician, asserting that Driver was and
had been a chronic alcoholic, was not challenged by respondent and the court accepted
as fact that Driver was a chronic alcoholic.
5. N.C. GEi. STAT., section 14-335 (1907): "If any person shall be found drunk or
intoxicated on the public highway, or at any public place or meeting.. , he shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished as is provided in this
section: (12) In . . . Durham (County) . . . for the third offense within any twelve
months period such offense is declared a misedmeanor, punishable as a misdemeanor
within the discretion of the court."
6. Ample precedent exists for the contention that the Eighth Amendment ('Tx-
cessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted" U.S.C.A., Const. Amend. 8.) does not apply to the states, supra,
note #3; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 10 Sup. Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519 (1890); O'Neil v.
State of Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 12 Sup. Ct. 693, 36 L.-d. 450 (1892). However, later
decisions have reserved deciding on the point, stating only where the punishment is
"inherently cruel," such as a restriction imposed in addition to and after one has served
a prison term, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793
(1910); or where one is tortured before executed, example given in Francis v. Res-
weber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 Sup. Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 91 L.Ed. 422 (1947); or where one is
persecuted severely by state officials while serving a prison term, Johnson v. Dye, 175
F.2d 250 (3rd Cir.) (reversed on other grounds 338 US. 864, 70 Sup. Ct. 146, 94 LEd.
530 (1949)). In the latter case it was stated "... we entertain no doubt that the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by a state."
Ibid, p.255.
7. The court accepted the definition of the United States Congress that an alcoholic
is "any person who chronically and habitually uses alcoholic beverages to the extent
that he has lost the power of self-control with respect to the use of such beverages:'
D.C. Code, section 24-502 (1947). See also, Manfred S. Guttmacher and Henry Wei-
hofen, Psycbiatry and The Law, at 318-322 (1952 ed.).
8. ".... passed in good faith to remedy . . . some evil not reached or corrected
by previous legislation ... and not repugnant to the constitution of North Carolina."
State v. Dew, 248 N.C. 188, 102 S.E.2d 774, 777 (1958).
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unusual.9 The court further ruled that an application of the various
tests and definitions of insanity" precluded a finding that the chronic
alcoholic fulfills the requirements exonerating one from criminal re-
sponsibility. The court stated that "an alcoholic is capable of under-
standing what he does and his lack of control is not the product of
mental disease or defect."-" In other words he lacks control over his
drinking but he maintains sufficient cognition to know it is wrong to
drink in public."
Although the District Court comes to the proper conclusion that
voluntary drunkenness, even in an alcoholic, does not offer an excuse
to defendant for his criminal acts,'3 the Court of Appeals formed an
exception to this general rule. It stated that for the act of public drunk-
enness the alcoholic is neither motivated by evil intent nor conscious of
any wrongdoing which are indispensable ingredients of a crime.' 4
Furthermore, freedom of volition is non-existent in the alcoholic when
confronted with liquor; for this reason he is insane for the particular
9. State v. Farrington, 141 N.C. 845, 53 S.E. 954 (1906).
10. "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was a product of
mental disease or mental defect." In what seems to supersede the test constructed by
the District Court for dismissing Driver's plea of insanity, this case further states that
"In determining whether accused was suffering from diseased or defective condition,
.. range of inquiry may include but is not limited to (italics added) whether accused
knew right from wrong, ... or had been deprived of or lost power of his will."
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
"Test for determining criminal responsibility of insane defendant... (that he) lacked
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to requirements of the law which he violat-
ed.' United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 752 (3rd Cir. 1960).
"... though conscious of the nature of his act and able to distinguish between right
and wrong and know that the act is wrong . . . yet his actions are not subject to his
will" and he would be declared insane. Davis v. United States, 165 U. S. 373, 17 S. Ct.
360, 41 L. Ed. 750 (1897) at p. 374.
Note well that all of these cases expressly state that a test of whether the accused can
distinguish right from wrong can not be an exclusive determinant of insanity.
11. Driver v. Hinant, supra, note 3 at p. 102.
12. This test standing alone has come into widespread disrepute in recent times."
.... the capacity of knowing right from wrong can be completely intact and function-
ing perfectly even though a defendant is otherwise demonstrably of disordered mind."
Glueck, "Psychiatry and The Criminal Law", 12 Mental Hygiene 575, 580 (1928), as
quoted in Deutsch, The Mentally Il in America, p. 396 (2nd ed. 1949); and see e.g.,
Menninger, The Human Mind, at p. 450 (1937).
13. "Generally, voluntary intoxication affords no defense to a charge of crime com-
mitted while under its influence especially where no particular motive, purpose or
intent is a necessary element of the crime charged." 22 C.J.S. section 66, p. 214, and
cases cited therein, especially Cody v. Commonwealth, 23 S.E.2d 122, 180 Va. 449;
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 25 S.E.2d 49, 181 Va. 490.
14. Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 52 (1952).
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act of drinking, whether it be in public or not 5 and cannot be held
criminally responsible.
While this decision holds that a chronic alcoholic cannot be con-
victed and punished by imprisonment for public drunkenness, it does
not overturn the myriad of court decisions establishing culpability of an
intoxicated person for his criminal acts. Only for the particular act of
public drunkenness is the chronic alcoholic excused from criminal re-
sponsibility. In addition, the court does not rule the North Carolina
Statute unconstitutional; punishment for public drunkenness is valid as
long as the drunkard is not suffering from the disease of alcoholism.
To corroborate its decision, which represents a significant change
in the judicial view of the alcoholic, the court uses Robinson v. Cali-
fornia.' In that case the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that a statute7 punishing the status of narcotic addiction was unconsti-
tutional, because it was punishing a disease and as such, was in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.'8 In the present case, the
court maintains that public drunkenness is a symptom of the disease of
alcoholism and any punishment of this symptom is not different from
punishing the disease itself. Drinking in public is merely an outward
manifestation of the alcoholic's disease; the compulsion to drink is
equally uncontrollable whether in public or private and the power of
15. The prohibited act must result from mental disease or defect either singly (italics
added) or in various combination with the "defendant's cognitio, his volition and his
capacity to control his behavior." Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 759 (8th Cir.
1961); cert denied, 368 U.S. 998, 82 S.Ct. 625, 7 L.E.2d 536. Note that this case states
that absence of volition alone may be sufficient grounds for escaping criminal re-
sponsibility.
16. 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962). In this case, the conviction
that the Supreme Court overruled was based on proof via circumstantial evidence, i.e.,
scars, physical characteristics, that the accused was a narcotic addict.
17. California Health and Safety Code, section 11721, as amended (1957); in part:
"No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of
narcotics ..... Any person convicted of violating any provision of this section is
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90
days nor more than one year in the county jail." As amended in 1963, the "or be
addicted to the use of" clause no longer exists. No case as to the constitutionality of
its present form has arisen.
18. The court circumvented the issue of applicability of the Eighth Amendment to
the state courts by stating that "the cruel and unusual punishment is in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment," Robinson v. State of California, supra note 16 at 667,
82 S.Ct. at 1421. That is to say, punishment of a disease denies the defendant due
process of law because it inflicts cruel and unusual punishment. This approach does,
as the lower court suggests in Driver v. Hinant, supra at p. 97, 243 F. Supp. 95
(E.D.N.C.), restrict the power of the states to define a crime, due to the fact that
the states are bound to heed the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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an independent volition escapes the alcoholic for this one criminal act,
making him insane.19
The court's rationale for its decision, despite dictum to the contrary,
brings to bear an important consideration: Does a chronic alcoholic now
fit into the category of an involuntary drunk, whose actions are almost
universally excused by the courts?20 The alcoholic has not been con-
sidered an involuntary drunk for purposes of excusing criminal actions 1
and the court expressly limits the scope of the case to the one criminal
action of public drunkenness.' But two justifications are given by the
court in reaching its decision: 1) the punishment of the symptoms of a
disease is in effect a punishment of the disease and 2) when an alcoholic
drinks it is not an act motivated or tempered by an independent vo-
lition. This second reason coincides markedly with accepted definitions
of an involuntary drunk.-3 The court relies solely on the first reason as
the basis for its refusal to extend exemption to the alcoholic for other
criminal actions stating that other criminal actions are not recognized
symptoms of the disease, yet it does state both reasons in concluding
that for the act of public drunkenness an alcoholic is excused. There-
fore, it would be fair to infer from this utilization of the second reason
that an alcoholic does not drink voluntarily.
It can certainly be argued as a result of this case that the chronic
alcoholic drinks with as little independent judgment and volition as one
who is forced to drink by another. He has no control over his actions
19. The court likens the alcoholic's inability to refrain from drinking in public "to
the movements of an imbecile or a person in a delirium of a fever. None of them by
attendance in the forbidden place defy sic the forbiddance." Driver v. Hinant, supra
at p.6,-F2d---.
20. People v. Stephens, 152 P.2d 1019, 66 CA. 2d 755; Choate v. State, 197 P. 1060,
10 Old. Cr. 169; Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029, 38 Ariz. 99; see note 23, infra.
21. Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424.
22. "However, our excusal of the chronic alcoholic from criminal prosecution
is confined exclusively to those acts on his part which are compulsive as symptomatic
of the disease. With respect to other behavior-not characteristic of confined chronic
alcoholism-he would be judged as would any person not so afflicted." Driver v. Hinant,
supra at p.6, .. F2d..... .. The court offers no explanation as to why a chronic
alcoholic would not be treated as any other involuntary drunk.
23. ". the absence of an exercise of independent judgment and volition on
the part of the accused in taking the intoxicant, as, for example, when he has been
made drunk by fraudulent contrivance of others, by casualty or by error of his physi-
cian." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 115 SE. 673, 677, 30 A..R. 755. In all
the cases where involuntary drunkenness was discussed, the courts felt that instigation
by another person was required to establish drunkenness as a valid defense to the accu-
sation. See note 20, supra.
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and is "powerless to stop drinking." " He is apparently under the same
disability as the person who is forced to drink and since the
involuntary drunk is excused from his actions, a logical analogy
would leave the chronic alcoholic with the same defense. How-
ever, the court refuses to either follow through, refute, or even men-
tion the analogy and thus overlook the serious implication of the state-
ments asserting that when the alcoholic drinks it is not his act. It is con-
tent with the ruling that alcoholism and its recognized symptoms,
specifically public drunkenness, cannot be punished.
Charles McDonald
Criminal Law-MuEDER-PROOF OF MALICE. In Biddle v. Common-
'wealtb,' the defendant was convicted of murder by starvation in the
first degree of her infant, child and on appeal she claimed that the
lower court erred in admitting her confession and that the evidence was
not sufficient to sustain the first degree murder conviction. The evi-
dence indicated that the defendant had the ability and means to feed
the infant. An autopsy revealed that the infant had not been fed for
several days as the entire intestinal tract and stomach were empty.
There was no evidence of any disease and the infant when born was
in perfect health.
The Supreme Court of Appeals-of Virginia ruled that the confessions
were admissible but reversed the lower court on the grounds that the
Commonwealth had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant wilfully or maliciously withheld food from the infant as re-
quired by Virginia Code Section 18.1-21, under which defendant had
been convicted.
The Virginia statute states that:
"Murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving ... is
murder in the first degree. All other murder is murder of the second
degree."2
Although both an intent to kill and malice are usually necessary
24. Public Health Service publication, No. 730, "Alcoholism', as prepared by the
National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health, US. Department of
Health Education and Welfare (1965).
1. 206 Va. 14, 141 S.E.2d 710 (1965).
2. VA. CODE AN., § 18.1-21 (1964 Cure. Supp.).
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